JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Axiom C-Barcan is introduced to allow the fixed point property C (A) D Ki C (A) to be provable for all i = 1, . . ., n, where Ki is the knowledge operator of player i. The additional C-Barcan axiom is needed to have the faithful embedding theorem of CKL into GL. In KD4W without the C-Barcan axiom, the iterative definition of common knowledge still makes sense, but would lose the fixed point property. The fixed point property is indispensable for the full epistemic consideration of Nash equilibrium.
We prove our faithful embedding result for the propositional part. The proof relies upon the cut-elimination theorem for GL(G) obtained in Kaneko-Nagashima [9] as well as upon the soundness-completeness theorem for CKL proved in HalpernMoses [2] and Lismont-Mongin [11] . We prove one lemma -Lemma 4.4 -using the soundness-completeness theorem for CKL. So far, completeness is available only for propositional CKL. If Lemma 4.4 could be proved for predicate common knowledge logic, the faithful embedding theorem would be obtained for predicate CKL and GL. This remains open.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 formulates finitary and infinitary epistemic logics KD4 and KD4W in the Hilbert style. In Section 3, we define common knowledge logic CKL as well as game logic GL in the Hilbert style. Then we state the faithful embedding theorem. The embedding part is immediately proved, but the faithfulness part needs game logic GL in the Gentzen style sequent calculus and its cut-elimination, which is the subject of Section 4. Section 5 formulates CKL directly as a sequent calculus, whose cut-elimination is proved from the results of Section 4. Section 6 discusses game theoretical applications. Section 7 gives some remarks. We define the set Son of infinitary formulae using induction twice. We denote 39f by 3 Hence the space Sa is closed with respect to the operation C (.). The infinitary language S' permits to express common knowledge as a conjunctive formula C (A). This is often called the iterative definition of common knowledge. One remark is that unless some logical structure is given, the common knowledge formula C (A) would be meaningless.
In the subsequent sections, we specify the logical structure. In the finitary language 9f, C (A) is not permitted. Therefore we prepare the common knowledge operator symbol Co to define common knowledge in terms of this symbol Co together with some axiom and inference rule, which will be called the fixed point definition. This will be discussed in Subsection 3.1.
We give the following five axiom schemata and three inference rules: For any formulae A, B, C, and set (D of formulae, A proof in KD4 is a finite tree with the following properties: (i) a formula in 3'f is associated with each node and the formula associated with each leaf is an instance of the above axioms; and (ii) adjoining nodes together with their associated formulae form an instance of the inference rules. A proof of A is one whose root A is associated with. If there is a proof of A, then A is said to be provable in KD4.
Since KD4W is infinitary, the definition of a proof in KD4 should be slightly extended in KD4W. A proof in KD4W is a countable tree with the following properties: (i) every path from the root is finite, (ii) a formula in _A4' is associated with each node and the formula associated with each leaf is an instance of the axioms; and (iii) adjoining nodes together with their associated formulae form an instance of the inference rules.
Of course, if A is provable in KD4, then it is provable in KD4W. Kaneko-Nagashima [7] adopted a stronger form of C-Barcan, i.e., for any countable infinite subset D Of 30k for any k < co,
A{Ki(B): B E (} D Ki(AD)
Game logic GL(H) presented here is weaker than the corresponding logic of [7] . Nevertheless, the restricted one is sufficient for practical purposes, i.e., game theoretical applications such as in Section 6.
In GL(H), the properties corresponding to axiom CA and inference CI hold, where C-Barcan is used only to prove F-G C(A) D KiC(A) for all i = 1, ... , n. PROOF. By definition, V/ is a mapping from -f' to the set of all cc-formulae. We can prove by induction on the structures of formulae in Of' that V/ is infective. Next, we define a function -from the set of cc-formulae to 9' inductively by replacing C(B) by Co( (B)). By induction, we can verify that W is an invective mapping from the set of cc-formulae to O and also that y(q,(A)) = A for all A E i.e., -is the inverse mapping of A/. Thus, V/ is a bijection from O1Ff to the set of cc-formulae.
Now we can state our first result. The only-if part will be proved in the end of this section and the if part will be proved in Section 4. THEOREM 
(Faithful Embedding I). For any A in -f, f-c A if and onlyif WFG V/(A).
This theorem clarifies the relationship between CKL and GL(H), and has also the implication that the iterative and fixed-point definitions of common knowledge are equivalent. By this theorem, we would obtain some important results converted from CKL to the fragment q(<3Ff) of GL(H) and vice versa. One example is a soundness-completeness theorem for the fragment V,(30,f) of GL(H). Other applications will be discussed in Sections 5 and 6. In a similar manner to in Section 3, a proof in GL(G) is defined to be a countable tree with the following properties: (i) every path from the root is finite; (ii) a sequent is associated with each node, and the sequent associated with each leaf is an initial sequent; and (iii) adjoining nodes together with the associated sequents form an instance of the above inference rules. A sequent F -* 0 is said to be provable in GL(G), denoted by F-G F-* 0, if there is a proof P such that F -* 0 is associated with the root of P.
The relationship between GL(H) and GL(G) is as follows, which was stated in Kaneko-Nagashima [9]. THEOREM CK-B) , in fact, violates the full subformula property that any formula occurring in a cut-free proof is a subformula of some formula in the endsequent of the proof. Nevertheless, since the principal formulae of (CK-B) are cc-formulae, it holds that if a non-ccformula A occurs in a cut-free proof, it is also a subformula in the endsequent. This implies (2) if the endsequent of a cut-free proof P consists of cc-formulae only, all the formulae occurring in P are cc-formulae.
(Equivalence of GL(H) and GL(G)). For any
Since the inverse images of those formulae by q' are in -f, we can consider this proof r-1 (P) from the viewpoint of deducibility F-c. Now we can state the main result, which will be proved in the end of this section. THEOREM 
(Faithful Embedding II). For any A in 3f, F-c A if and only if F-G -) (A).
When we restrict ,F to the space of finitary formulae, the above logic becomes sequent calculus KD4, since (CK-B) is not allowed. Sequent calculus KD4 admits cut-elimination and its cut-free proof satisfies the full subformula property. Since CKL is a conservative extension of KD4 by Theorem 3. 1, GL(G) is also a conservative extension of KD4 by Theorem 4.3. A concrete application of this observation will be given in Section 6.
The only-if part of Theorem 4.3 follows from the only-if part of Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 4.1.(1). Hence we prove the if part of Theorem 4.3. Once this is proved, the if part of Theorem 3.4 follows from this and Theorem 4.1. (1).
To prove the if part of Theorem 4.3, first, we prepare the following lemma. P') is a cut-free proof of r-1 (F') --1 (0' ) in CKL(G). We prepare 2n-ary predicate symbol Ri ( :) and n-ary predicate symbol Di (.) for each i = 1,... , n. We define Ri (a,,... , an : bl',... , bn) and Di (a,,... , an) to   be atomic formulae, where i = 1,... n and (a,1... . an), (b,.1.. ,bn) Since D (1-4) is a nonlogical axiom, we do not allow it to be an initial formula in a proof, for our logics do not satisfy the deduction theorem. We treat nonlogical axioms as follows: For a set F of formulae and a formula A, we write F-G A if For a game g not satisfying (5), we need further assumptions in order to have a result parallel to Theorem 6.3 (see Kaneko [5] ). Also for the game of Table 6 .2, the above axiomatization requiring the common knowledge of various formulae may be regarded as too stringent. In this game, each player can make a decision to maximize his payoff by using only the knowledge of his own payoff function. In fact, we can weaken the above axiomatization for such games. However, for the game of Table 6 .1, the above axiomatization is unavoidable. See Kaneko [3] .
Let (X', w) k=z A. Then (X', w) k=a Ki K(B) for all K E Uln<wO K(m). This implies that for any v with (w, v) E Ri, (A', v) k=, K(B) for all K E Un<w K(m). Thus for all v with (w, v) E Ri, (X', v) k=, Co(B) by K2. Thus (X, w) =, Ki Co(B) by K1. This implies that for all A', w E W and a, (A',w) k=, A D KiCo(B). Thus

PROOF. (1) For this, we have to verify only that the translations of (C0 o), (-CO) and (CoK-B) by q' are legitimate in GL(G). Indeed, these translations are instances of (A -), (-A) and (CK-B). For example, (-*C0) is translated into {yi(A) -y(A), K(y(A)): K E Um<K,,K(m)} ( A)
By the faithful embedding theorems, the above axiomatization can be converted to CKL. We note that WD is a schema and has more formulae in GL than in CKL but only {C(Nash(x)) : x E E} is used as s? in Theorem 6. 1-4) ). See Kaneko [5] for further applications.
The last comment is on the undecidability result obtained in Kaneko-Nagashima [7] for a game with mixed strategies. Even when mixed strategies are allowed, we could obtain the above axiomatization with no essential changes, though a predicate extension of GL as well as the language of an ordered field theory are required. For a game with pure strategies, we cannot guarantee a game to have a Nash equilibrium, but it is the basic theorem by Nash [13] that every finite game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. It follows from this existence result and Tarski's completeness theorem on the real closed field theory that C (Frcf), C (AiG) Kcw C ( YNash(t)), where Orcf is the set of real closed field axioms in the ordered field language based on the constants 0, 1, function symbols +, -, *, /, and predicates >, =. Note that the equality axioms are included in Orcf. However, the playability of a game is formulated, based on the counterpart of Theorem 6.3, as whether C(O~rcf), C(AiG) FO-Z7.C(Nash(7)) or not. That is, the pure knowledge of the existence is not sufficient, but the specific knowledge is required. In fact, KanekoNagashima [7] prove that there is a 3-person game with two pure strategies for each player such that it has a unique Nash equilibrium but 
